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What Race Terms Do:
Du Bois, Biology, and Psychology on the
Meanings of “Race”
G. M. Trujillo, Jr.
Vanderbilt University
Abstract: This paper does two things.  First, it interprets the work of W. E. 
B. Du Bois to reveal that the meanings of race terms are grounded by both a 
historical and an aspirational component.  Race terms refer to a backward-
looking component that traces the history of the group to its present time, 
as well as a forward-looking component that sets out values and goals for 
the group.  Race terms thus refer to a complex cluster of concepts that 
involve biological, sociological, historical, moral, and political properties. 
Second, the paper defends W. E. B. Du Bois’s conservationist thesis about 
races, which holds that we should maintain race talk and racial distinctions. 
But instead of offering philosophical evidence, this paper defends the 
plausibility of the conservationist thesis with evidence from contemporary 
biology and psychology.  It argues that, instead of eliminating race terms 
or concepts, we should conserve and revise them.
Keywords: Du Bois, race, psychology, biology, eliminativism, 
conservationism
In 1899, four years after W. E. B. Du Bois became the fi rst black man to 
earn a Ph.D.  from Harvard and two years after he accepted a professorship 
at Atlanta University, Sam Hose was lynched.  2000 men, women, and 
children gathered as a mob.  They tied Hose to a tree, built a pyre, and 
set him ablaze.  Then they dismembered him.  They took as souvenirs his 
ears, fi ngers, genitals, bones, liver, heart, and fl esh.  Those who did not 
bought pieces from individuals and shopkeepers who took extra.  This 
happened within 40 miles of Du Bois.  And similar monstrosities happened 
to Richard Coleman, George Ward, and others (Young, 2005, pp. 639-40; 
Dray, 2002, ch. 1).
My title likely primed you for why I start with this account.  Hose 
was black.  His murderers and complicit audience were white.  Race terms 
are integral to the story.  Moreover, my main interlocutor here, W. E. B. 
Du Bois, studied the complex roles played by race in human history.  He 
lived them too; his own infant died of diphtheria because white doctors in 
Atlanta refused to treat black children (Lewis, 2009, pp. 162-4).
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These events establish the stakes of race talk.  Race terms cannot 
be analyzed in abstract, cool ways without losing meaning and context. 
When a black man’s knuckles could be jarred and placed in a storefront 
window to warn black people to stay in line (Dray, 2002, p. 82), analysts 
neglect part of the discourse about “race” if they focus only on natural 
properties grounding the semantics.1  The ways “race” has been used are 
complex, and defi nitions of “race” should refl ect this.  The situation today 
is the same.
Some people (e.g. some “eliminativists”) abandon race terms.  They 
argue that no single foundation can ground them, or they hope to disarm 
oppressors of linguistic distinctions to stop the horrors.2  But W. E. B. Du 
Bois wanted to conserve race talk.3  Race terms and racial identities, he 
held, could serve the political ends of unifi cation and organization.  To 
call yourself an “American Negro,” for Du Bois, meant that you identifi ed 
with the history of Negroes in America, committed yourself to getting 
wider American culture to appreciate the artistic and social achievements 
of Negroes, and fought for de facto (and not mere de jure) equality.4
I will explain Du Bois’s theory of race in this paper.  I do not think 
Du Bois’s use of “race” is incomplete or perplexing, like Kwame Anthony 
Appiah has argued (1995).5 Instead, I agree with Lucius T.  Outlaw, Jr.  that 
when Du Bois uses the term “race,” he refers to a cluster of concepts—
biological, sociological, historical, moral, and political.  This analysis stays 
true to the complexities of the uses of “race” by many different speakers 
and avoids essentialist traps (Outlaw, 1995).6 So what am I contributing? 
I want to include contemporary biology and psychology in explicating 
Du Bois’s theory.  Contemporary sciences lend credibility to his project 
of conserving race talk, especially if the main alternative is to eliminate 
it.  As I understand it, two empirical problems beset semantic theories 
analyzing race terms.  First, a theory must make sense of contemporary 
genetics.  And second, a theory must account for psychological data that 
explains how we perceive one another and why we form groups.  Because 
Du Bois grounds race terms in two ways (what I dub the “historical” and 
“aspirational” anchors), he can integrate this data in ways eliminativist 
theories cannot.
1. How Du Bois Anchors “Race”
Near the beginning of “The Conservation of Races,” W. E. B. Du Bois 
writes: “The question, then, which we must seriously consider is this: What 
is the real meaning of Race; what has, in the past, been the law of race 
development, and what lessons has the past history of race development 
to teach the rising Negro people” ([1897] 1986, p. 815).  What strikes 
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me about this formulation is that the meaning of “Race” is bound to two 
things:
1. the historical anchor: the historical development 
of a race to its present time, and
2. the aspirational anchor: historical lessons from a 
race’s development that can be used to guide that 
race toward its self-selected goals.7
Du Bois binds a race term to its historical development and future 
ambitions, forming a set of complex properties to which race terms refer. 
Through synecdoche, any of the heterotypical race terms—color terms like 
“black” and “white,” ethnicity terms like “African” and “European,” or 
anthropological words like “Negroid” and “Caucasoid”—can refer to the 
cluster concepts associated with that race term.  In looking at the different 
ways race terms function, as well as the varied concepts a single race term 
may refer to, Du Bois transforms the question “What does ‘race’ mean?” 
into “What can ‘race’ do?”8
This intellectual strategy excises the meaning of “race” from exclusive 
identifi cations with biological essences or natural properties.  And it 
nudges conversation toward socio-political questions about how “race” 
has operated diachronically in particular historical settings.
2. The Historical Anchor
Most poignant for the conversation of race development, or the historical 
anchor, Du Bois writes:
It [a race] is a vast family of human beings, generally of common 
blood and language, always of common history, traditions and 
impulses, who are both voluntarily and involuntarily striving 
together for the accomplishment of certain more or less vividly 
conceived ideals of life. ([1897] 1986, p. 817 [Emphasis added])
Du Bois allows that physical and measurable things like blood and 
language play integral roles in racial formation.  That is, lines of heredity 
and linguistics “generally” correlate with racial groups.  However, he 
contrasts these features with a set of universal qualities that “always” 
partially constitute a given race: common history, traditions, impulses, 
and strivings for ideals of life.  In other words, it is imaginable that 
members of a common race could speak different languages or have 
different lines of descent, though most often they will share both.  But 
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it would be unimaginable that members of the same race would differ 
on some common set of historical narratives and motivations for action. 
This cluster of properties—general traits like skin color, hair color, and 
language; and universal traits like traditions, impulses, and strivings—
applies to the group of people to whom the race term refers.
These histories and motivations can parallel human behavior and 
historical accounts in their complexity.  But for Du Bois, it is the identity 
formed by history and inherited goals that will always partially constitute 
the meaning of a race term.9  The previous passage contends, moreover, 
that history tracks the meaning of race terms better than phenotype or 
language.10
The historical anchor is so crucial for Du Bois that he reemphasizes 
it.11  Race cannot be measured disinterestedly from the outside, as by 
plucking strands of hair for genetic sequencing or tracing lineages in 
archives.  Instead, it must be understood with respect to the inner life of a 
people—how they collectively feel, think, and act both to endure adversity 
and to reach their goals; and how they give reasons, justifi cations, and 
narratives for their actions.  What makes the Teuton different from the 
Negro is not reducible to skin color or language, though both inevitably 
play parts.  Instead, the most fundamental differences between races exist 
in the spiritual and psychical life of the people.  Skin color and bloodline 
affect the day-to-day life of a race, but not as much as shared stories about 
a race’s origin, common systems of religion, or reaffi rmed statements 
about how to live well.12
Deceptively, the qualities of historical experience and narrative sound 
abstract.  However, a race’s history is not solely determined by its own 
actions.  Wider communities treat racial groups in ways they cannot 
control.  The history of the American Negro involves studying how wider 
society treated slaves, freed persons, and people perceived as either.  Du 
Bois addresses the challenges of being a Negro in America:
[T]he Negro is still a group apart, with almost no social 
recognition, subject to insult and discrimination, with income 
and wage far below the average of the nation and the most 
deliberately exploited industrial class in America.  Even trained 
Negroes have increasing diffi culty in making a living suffi cient 
to sustain a civilized standard of life. ([1933] 1986, p. 1023)
Negroes in America did not choose to be treated in these ways, but public 
policy and racist individuals discriminated against them.  American society 
made issues of political recognition, economic equality, and survival of 
traumas.  When Negroes could be dismembered as souvenirs, or when 
physicians refused to treat 18-month-old infants, the historical effects of 
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race are anything but abstract.  These tangible effects constitute part of the 
historical anchor.
The advantage of not exclusively tying the meaning of race terms to 
biological properties is that Du Bois could affi rm contemporary evidence 
that races do indeed have a biological component, but he can also say they 
are more complex than that.  Geneticists who analyze populations can 
identify, with a high degree of accuracy, which biological race a single 
person belongs to—East Asian, Caucasian, and Sub-Saharan African.  By 
measuring a person’s genes and comparing them with the frequency of 
alleles in known race groups, a biologist can identify a person’s geographic 
racial origin (Wade, 2015, ch. 5).13  Du Bois can incorporate this data into 
his theory of race.  But just as most people would further interrogate one’s 
race with questions about language, social upbringing, and political goals, 
Du Bois can include further information in the race term’s meaning by 
associating them with a cluster of concepts.  The biological portion of race 
terms is therefore integrated into a more holistic set of properties that a 
race term refers to.  Moreover, Du Bois need not limit himself to the three 
biological racial categories; he can use additional historical information to 
discuss the meanings of race terms.  He thus provides a fl exible framework 
that accounts for the wide variety of races and the nuanced information we 
often incorporate into racial categories.
3.  e Aspirational Anchor
Du Bois infuses his writings with calls to action and defi nitions of goals for 
the American Negro.  These constitute the aspirational anchor, so named 
because it involves a future orientation of a people setting out things to 
achieve.  At any given moment, a race must not only describe its identity 
as following from historical circumstances, but it must also decide whether 
and how to change it.  For example, Du Bois writes:
 
 As such, it is our duty to conserve our physical powers, our 
intellectual endowments, our spiritual ideals; as a race we must 
strive by race organization, by race solidarity, by race unity to 
the realization of that broader humanity which freely recognizes 
differences in men, but sternly deprecates inequality in their 
opportunities of development.
For the accomplishment of these ends we need race 
organizations: Negro colleges, Negro newspapers, Negro 
business organizations, a Negro school of literature and art, 
and an intellectual clearing house, for all these products of 
the Negro mind, which we may call a Negro Academy.  Not 
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only is all this necessary for positive advance, it is absolutely 
imperative for negative defense.  … [O]ur one haven of refuge 
is ourselves, and but one means of advance, our own belief 
in our great destiny, our own implicit trust in our ability and 
worth.  ...  And such a people must be united; not merely united 
for the organized theft of political spoils, not united to disgrace 
religion with whoremongers and ward-heelers; not united 
merely to protest and pass resolutions, but united to stop the 
ravages of consumption among the Negro people, united to 
keep black boys from loafi ng, gambling and crime; united to 
guard the purity of black women and to reduce that vast army 
of black prostitutes that is today marching to hell; and united in 
serious organizations, to determine by careful conference and 
thoughtful interchange of opinion the broad lines of policy and 
action for the American Negro. ([1897] 1986, pp. 822-823; see 
also: [1933] 1986, p. 1024)
“Negro” bears normative heft.  Identifying as a race means having a 
genuine interest in the values that group lives by and the things they struggle 
for.14 This future and aspirational orientation of a race shows that a race 
can organize people, not in the sense of bunching them into biologically 
essential kin, but in the sense of giving a people values, motivations, 
and goals to identify with.  As with the historical anchor, the aspirational 
anchor is not tethered to abstract ideas.  The aspirational anchor makes 
concrete proposals for social organization and political action.  Note, race 
terms respond to a group’s beliefs and circumstances.  For example, where 
repealing Jim Crow laws was a tangible concern a few decades ago, today 
the reform of the criminal justice system might be more relevant.15
But when invidious racial discrimination has led to so much pain and 
opposition, some might wonder: is it not better to jettison the idea of races 
altogether and identify as “American” rather than “Negro,” or unite under 
a cosmopolitan banner of “human”?16  Why preserve the word “Negro” 
or the concept of races?  After all, as Darwin noted, whatever differences 
exist between humans, their likenesses are more numerous (ctd. Du Bois, 
[1897] 1986, p. 816).  Du Bois responds:
Names are only conventional signs for identifying things.  
Things are the reality that counts.  If a thing is despised, either 
because of ignorance or because it is despicable, you will not 
alter matters by changing its name.  If men despise Negroes, 
they will not despise them less if Negroes are called “colored” 
or “Afro-Americans.” ([1928] 1986, p. 1220)
Members of racial groups are treated differently not because of mere 
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linguistic convention, but because of deeper social habits.  Eliminating 
race terms does little to undo the underlying discriminations of people 
who employ racial slurs, oppressive policies, or cognitive biases.  Our 
reproach should target ignorant discrimination and social strife, not racial 
categories alone.  Du Bois adds: “a Negro by any other name would be 
just as black and just as white; just as ashamed of himself and just as 
shamed by others, as today.  It is not the name—it’s the Thing that counts” 
([1928] 1986, p. 1222).  This insight draws me to Du Bois.  He holds 
a conservationist thesis—that racial categories ought to be revised and 
preserved because properly restored racial categories do important social 
work (cf. Kelly, Machery, and Mallon, 2010, pp. 435-6).17
Du Bois’s thesis can also make sense of psychological data on racial 
cognition and the development of in- and out-groups.  Specifi cally, he 
can integrate three important fi ndings.  First, it is likely that humans have 
a genetic predisposition toward forming groups to foster cooperation. 
Comparative primate studies show that humans and similar primates form 
in- and out-groups.  Complex societies accomplish more than individuals 
living separately.  To promote this behavior, primates correct each other’s 
conduct, punish violations of group norms, and make judgments about each 
other’s intentions.  Humans have developed neurochemical responses to 
reinforce such group formations.  To aid the development of trust between 
group members, oxytocin is often released through interactions with in-
group members.  This neurotransmitter rewards cooperation but also 
predisposes people to distrust outsiders.18 Second, but related to the fi rst, 
humans have likely developed a cognitive system for racial recognition. 
Such a system might help humans to detect racial properties, track social 
coalitions, or notice ethnicities.  Du Bois’s strategy to conserve race terms 
and reform racialized concepts takes advantage of genetic predispositions 
toward socially organized behavior, and it readapts the cognitive systems 
that we use to identify each other.  This lends plausibility to a conservationist 
thesis because trying to eliminate race terms, or racial categorization 
altogether, would work against biological and cognitive obstacles.19
The third and fi nal psychological fi nding emphasizes just how quickly 
and intensely we form group associations.  Infants, for example, prefer 
familiarity.  Soon after birth, they show preference for the racial groups 
that raised them.  If a baby is nurtured by Caucasian caretakers, then they 
will stare longer at Caucasian faces than non-Caucasian ones.  This effect 
can be mitigated by raising a baby in a racially diverse environment, but the 
fi nding emphasizes the rapidity and automaticity of our racial judgments. 
Relatedly, the strength of the bonds we form for our in-group, and against 
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out-groups, is alarming.  Take, for example, the Robbers Cave Experiment, 
which was performed on a group of middle-class, white, fi fth-grade boys. 
At a summer camp, researchers randomly divided the boys into two groups 
and kept them in their own cabins and areas.  The boys quickly formed 
separate identities.  When they met again, the boys escalated from cautious 
interactions to outright hostility—using racial slurs and vandalizing each 
other’s cabins.  Only after the researchers constructed a scenario where 
both groups had to cooperate to fi x a broken water pipe did the groups 
cease their violence.20
None of this data dooms us to invidious racial discrimination.  But 
it should show how quickly and naturally we begin judging the races 
of others and forming social groups.  My hope is that it also renders the 
conservationist program more practically plausible than the eliminativist 
one.
4. A Practical Conclusion
Because Du Bois offers two ways to anchor race terms, and because race 
terms refer to a cluster of concepts, he offers a framework that can integrate 
the complex data from biology and psychology, while still making sense 
of socio-historical data and fl uid group identities.  Moreover, because 
he proposes that we conserve racial distinctions, he taps into a natural 
tendency to do so—reinforced by our genetic predisposition toward 
group organization, our cognitive systems that recognize races, and our 
social tendencies to form strong in-group bonds and out-group distrust. 
Certainly, we need to reform our tendencies and retrain our minds.  But 
Du Bois offers us a way forward that simply denying the reality of races 
(or wishing to eliminate them) fails to offer.
People already talk about races, and it is diffi cult to imagine how 
they could not.  The fact of the matter is that different racialized groups 
have been treated in certain ways historically.  And those same racialized 
groups often discuss their particular issues in specifi c racialized terms. 
There is an element of practicality here.21  Race terms can be used for pride 
and social uplift, which consequently drive people forward.22  Du Bois 
understood that racial identities can support the social uplift of a group, 
and rehabilitated notions associated with a given race term can become 
features to take pride in.23
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Notes
 1 The abstraction from sociocultural and historical particularities of actual 
situations is what I take as the main detriment to Kwame Anthony Appiah’s 
infl uential “The Uncompleted Argument” (1995).
At two crucial junctions, Appiah glosses over particular differences between 
different groups of people.  First, he asks, “For what common impulses—whether 
voluntary or involuntary—do the Romance people share that the Teutons and the 
English do not?” (1995, p. 66).  And second, “If what Du Bois has in common 
with Africa is a history of ‘discrimination and insult,’ then this binds him, by his 
own account, to ‘yellow Asia and...  the South Seas’ also” (1995, p. 74).  Certainly 
humans share common impulses, e.g. a desire to be treated fairly.  And they even 
share, at some point or another, a history of discrimination and insult.  But the 
differences matter.  The exact expressions of the preferences for fairness and the 
particular circumstances the preferences react against, as well as the exact society 
that enacts tangible policy or historical monstrosities, matter.  We can admit 
that, for example, Jewish folk in Nazi Germany and Japanese folk in America 
were both imprisoned in their domestic lands.  But it is crucial to acknowledge 
the differences in the reasons the government did it, the exact conditions of the 
prisoners, and how societies have admitted or ignored this part of their history.  To 
distinguish groups—which race terms often do—the differences matter more than 
the similarities.  Examples could multiply, e.g.  many groups have been enslaved, 
but the differences between chattel slavery, domestic servitude, debt labor, sex 
traffi cking, and other forms matter. 
 2 Appiah, for example, challenges race terms, but he also writes, “The 
concept of race might be a unicorn, but its horn could draw blood” (2014, p. 113). 
So, he openly acknowledges how socially constructed terms can cause harm. 
 3 W. E. B. Du Bois most forcibly argued for this in his 1897 essay  “The 
Conservation of Races” ([1897] 1986).  But it is a theme throughout many of his 
works. 
 4 I am uncertain about whether Du Bois intended these to be jointly 
suffi cient conditions for grounding race terms (i.e. if a person cannot meet all 
of them, they are not that race).  I also suspect that these qualities might not 
be individually necessary.  My main point is that race talk is complex, and Du 
Bois’s theory offers the best framework for its analysis, neither eliminating racial 
distinctions nor reducing it to biological components.  Creating necessary and 
suffi cient conditions for membership in a race is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 5 Appiah’s position has changed in the decades since his article was 
published, but he is still cited as an archetype of eliminativism. 
 6 Outlaw summarizes, “Race is thus to be understood as a cluster concept that 
brings together biological, cultural, and geographical properties in ‘indefi nitely 
long disjunctive defi nitions’ in which the properties do not defi ne a race by each 
property being ‘severally necessary and the entire set of necessary properties... 
jointly suffi cient.’” (1995, p. 84).  He repeats a similar point when writing, “To this 
extent both the concept of race and that of racial categories refer to heterogenous 
244
G. M. Trujillo, Jr.
complexes of socially normed biological and cultural factors.  The biological 
features in racial distinctions are conscripted into projects of cultural, political, 
and social construction” (1995, p. 85). 
 7 This categorization into two anchors is my own.  It is not how Du Bois 
describes his own project. 
 8 I do not mean to imply any strong modal notions by using the term “can” 
in the question, “What can ‘race’ do?” Du Bois has a practical goal in mind: unite 
the Negro people to uplift them.  No detailed notion of possibility needs to be 
worked out here.  Du Bois is foremost working in this actual world, here and now 
and in the near future. 
 9 G. W. F. Hegel makes a similar point when talking about what unifi ed the 
diverse city-states of ancient Greece.  In the Phenomenology of Spirit, he argues 
that the epic poems of the Greeks formed a cohesive identity between Greeks 
as disparate as Athenians, Spartans, and Arcadian.  Moreover, their tragedies 
revealed common cultural confl icts, and their comedies allowed for them to gain 
refl ective distance to begin resolving of the confl icts (1977, §727 ff.). 
 10 It is no coincidence that Du Bois begins The Souls of Black Folk with a 
chapter entitled “Of Our Spiritual Strivings,” wherein he describes the history and 
psychology of the Negro people, and which he concludes by imploring Negroes to 
band together in their work, culture, and history to develop the extant yet neglected 
cultural greatness of Negroes.  It does not matter that American Negroes might 
speak different tribal dialects, creoles, or idioms.  It does not matter if they were 
born in Africa, the Caribbean, or American Atlantic.  What matters most is that 
they identify as Americans and as Negroes by unifying over a common way of 
experiencing the world and a shared set of values (Du Bois, [1903] 1986, pp. 363-
5, 370; [1897] 1986, p. 821). 
 11 For example, Du Bois writes,
What is the real distinction between these nations [or races]?  
Is it the physical differences of blood, color, and cranial 
measurements?  Certainly we must all acknowledge that 
physical differences play a great part, and that, with wide 
exceptions and qualifi cations, these eight great races of to-
day follow the cleavage of race distinctions...  But while race 
differences have followed mainly physical race lines, yet no 
mere physical distinctions would really defi ne or explain 
the deeper differences—the cohesiveness and continuity of 
these groups.  The deeper differences are spiritual, psychical 
differences—undoubtedly based on the physical, but infi nitely 
transcending them. ([1897] 1986, p. 818)
 
 12 Du Bois stresses the collective aspect of a race when he lambasts the 
idea of individualism in history: “We see the Pharaohs, Caesars, Toussaints and 
Napoleons of history and forget the vast races of which they were but epitomized 
expressions...  This [individualistic] assumption of which the Negro people are 
especially fond, can not be established by a careful consideration of history” 
([1897] 1986, p. 817).  That is, not just any history can contribute to discussions 
of race; rather, the history must be informed by entire tribes, groups, or peoples. 
This is why social sciences and humanistic disciplines (versus natural sciences) 
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are privileged in pointing to the reality of race, how it is developed, and where 
it is going.  If understood solely through science, race development shows a 
mere history of underdetermining data and overdetermining theory, a handful of 
granular data that escape the grasp of a unifying theorist just as she clutches her 
hand.  Yet, if understood through history and sociology, the development of races 
can be understood and sculpted for future purposes. 
 13 The point here is not that the triad of biological races is correct, as there 
are alternatives (see: Wade, 2015, p. 100).  My argument only requires that 
there is some biological basis for race, which I think Du Bois’s framework does 
well at integrating.  The biological data shows that races do, in fact, exist in a 
more-than-subjective or more-than-socially-constructed way.  Even so, history 
shows that social construction matters too; appealing to ontological abuses of 
social construction won’t stop a lynch mob.  The philosophical challenge lay in 
integrating the complex data. 
 14 Kwame Anthony Appiah, for example, characterizes racial identities as 
a nominal (they can label a person), normative (people of the race should act a 
certain way, and people in wider society should treat that race in a certain way), 
subjective (people of a race often characterize what they do as acting as a race), 
and narrative (racial identities play a role in how people create the arc of their 
lives) (2014, pp. 148-152). 
 15 For an analysis of contemporary problems in the criminal justice system, 
as well as its historical development, see: Alexander (2012). 
 16 Similar questions are put to Du Bois by a teenage reader of The Crisis 
([1928] 1986, pp. 1219-20). 
 17 The article Kelly, Machery, and Mallon write does not name Du Bois as 
a conservationist; they characterize conservationist position based on: Outlaw 
(1995).  For a more detailed discussion of conservationism, see:  Mallon (2006, p. 
526 ff).
Du Bois’s argument takes on the form of a dilemma.  Either we should 
conserve races or we should not.  Implicit is that not conserving races will do no 
good (e.g. by using terms of nationality or species membership instead).  It then 
follows that we should conserve races. 
 18 For a review of primate and human social behavior, see: Wade (2015, pp. 
41-53).  Wade especially emphasizes the research of  Michael Tomasello (2009). 
 19 For a review of the cognitive systems involved in racial recognition, see: 
Kelly, Machery, and Mallon (2010, sec. 2). 
 20 For a review of psychological experiments on racial recognition and group 
formation in infants and children, see Bloom (2013, ch. 4). 
 21 Du Bois explains:
[W]hat word shall we use when we want to talk about those 
descendants of dark slaves who are largely excluded still from 
full American citizenship and from complete social privilege 
with white folk?  Here is Something that we want to talk about; 
that we do talk about; that we Negroes could not live without 
talking about.  In that case, we need a name for it, do we not?  
 In order to talk logically and easily and be understood.  If you 
do not believe in the necessity of such a name, watch the antics 
of a colored newspaper which has determined in a fi t of New 
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Year’s Resolutions not to use the word “Negro!”
And then too, without the word that means Us, where are 
all those spiritual ideals, those inner bonds, those group ideals 
and forward strivings of this mighty army of 12 millions?  Shall 
we abolish these with the abolition of a name?  Do we want to 
abolish them?  Of course we do not.  They are our most precious 
heritage. ([1928] 1986, p. 1221)
 
 22 Du Bois emphasizes this point in another essay as well:
A new organized group action along economic lines, guided by 
intelligence and with the express object of making it possible for 
Negroes to earn a better living and, therefore, more effectively 
to support agencies for social uplift, is without the slightest 
doubt the next step.  ...  This organization is going to involve 
deliberate propaganda for race pride.  That is, it is going to start 
out by convincing American Negroes that there is no reason 
for their being ashamed of themselves; that their record is one 
which should make them proud; that their history in Africa and 
the world is a history of effort, success and trial, comparable 
with that of any other people.  ...  There is no other way; let us not 
be deceived.  American Negroes will be beaten into submission 
and degradation if they merely wait unorganized to fi nd some 
place voluntarily given them in the new reconstruction of the 
economic world.  They must themselves force their race into 
the new economic set-up and bring with them millions of West 
Indians and Africans by peaceful organization for normative 
action or else drift into greater poverty, greater crime, greater 
helplessness until there is no resort by the last red alternative of 
revolt, revenge and war. ([1933] 1986, pp. 1024-5)
 
 23 I am indebted to Lucius T. Outlaw, Jr. and Thomas W. Holaday for their 
extensive feedback on previous drafts.  Sebastian Ramirez also generously served 
as a sounding board.  Any remaining mistakes prove that even the best feedback 
cannot cure my philosophical denseness. 
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